The
Morality of Double Standards
Political
disagreement is healthy in a free republic. Moral inconsistency is not. One
of the defining characteristics of a just society is that it applies the same
moral standard regardless of who commits the act. Murder is wrong whether the
victim is conservative or progressive. Oppression is wrong whether it is
carried out by a Western democracy or a Middle Eastern dictatorship. Freedom of
speech is either a principle or it is merely a privilege extended to those we
happen to agree with. Increasingly, however, public outrage appears less
tied to universal principles than to political identity.
When
conservative commentator Charlie Kirk was murdered while engaging in public
political discourse, some voices immediately searched for explanations that
diminished the tragedy. Rather than beginning with the simple proposition that
political violence is unacceptable in a free society, the discussion often
shifted to whether his views somehow invited such hatred. Contrast
that with the treatment of activists who deliberately confront law enforcement
during protests. When encounters end in injury or death, the narrative
frequently centers on victimhood, systemic injustice, and institutional blame.
The same event, loss of human life, is filtered through an entirely different
moral lens.
Part
of the answer lies within an intellectual tradition that has become
increasingly influential in universities, media, and activist organizations.
Rather than viewing society primarily as a collection of individuals possessing
equal rights and equal moral worth, this tradition interprets history as a
struggle between oppressors and the oppressed. Moral judgment becomes
inseparable from power.
Under
this framework, actions are evaluated less by what was done than by who did it. If
an action weakens institutions viewed as oppressive, it is often excused or
minimized. If the identical action strengthens those same institutions, it is
condemned as immoral. Justice becomes conditional rather than
universal. This helps explain why outrage often appears selective in
international affairs. When civilians suffer in conflicts involving
Western democracies or their allies, condemnation is immediate and often
justified. Yet the brutal repression of Iranian citizens by their own
government has frequently received far less sustained attention from many of
the same activist movements. The victims are no less human. The suffering is no
less real. Yet moral urgency often appears unequal. That inconsistency
deserves examination.
Thinkers
such as Herbert Marcuse openly questioned the classical liberal idea that all
viewpoints deserve equal tolerance. His concept of “liberating tolerance”
argued that tolerating certain ideas could perpetuate systems of domination.
Michel Foucault viewed political struggle largely through the lens of power,
even expressing early sympathy for the Iranian Revolution before its
authoritarian character became undeniable. Whether one agrees with
these philosophers or not, their influence is difficult to deny. Their ideas
continue to shape portions of contemporary academic and activist thought.
The
danger arises when political objectives replace universal moral principles. If
morality depends upon which group holds power, then justice becomes impossible.
Every act can be justified if committed by the “right” people against the
“wrong” people. Violence becomes resistance. Censorship becomes protection.
Intolerance becomes tolerance. History repeatedly demonstrates where that
path leads.
The
American experiment was founded upon a radically different proposition: that
every individual possesses inherent rights that do not depend upon race, class,
religion, or political affiliation. Those rights belong equally to friend and
opponent alike. They are not granted by the government nor withdrawn because
one’s ideas are unpopular. A free society cannot survive if moral
standards are applied selectively. The true test of principle is not
whether it protects those we admire. It is whether it protects those with whom
we profoundly disagree. Universal principles are difficult precisely
because they require consistency.
Double
standards require only politics.